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The Challenges of Security 
Council Reform 
Carol M. Glen 
Valdosta State University 
The issue of reforming the United Nations Security Coun-
cil acquired new urgency in the wake of disputes over the 
wa r in Iraq. The acrimony of the dispute and the ultimate 
failure of the Se cu rit y Council to reach agreement, se-
riously undermined the perceived legitimacy of the Coun-
cil. However , although the crisis brought the issue of 
reform to the fore it was not the first time that such 
reform had been discus se d . Almost since the founding of 
the UN, the structure of the Security Council has been a 
point of contention for those who believe that they are 
effectively disenfranchised within the system. Together 
the twin problems of Security Council effectiveness and 
equitable representation have come together to streng-
then the case for reform . This paper places current at-
tempts at Security Council reform into historical context 
and assesses the challenges that these reform proposals 
face. 
The issue of reforming the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) acquired new urgency in the wake of the bitter disputes over the war in Iraq. During negotiations the 
United States warned that the Security Council risked irrelevan-
cy if it did not act to confront blatant violations of its own reso-
lutions. Others implicitly contended that the Security Council 
should not allow itself to be used simply as a rubber stamp for a 
policy position already pre-determined by one its members. In 
the eyes of many, the acrimony of the dispute and the ultimate-
failure of the Security Council members to reach agreement se-
riously undermined the perceived legitimacy of the Council in 
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particular and the United Nations more generally. In the words of 
Kofi Annan (2003) "rarely have such dire forecasts been made 
about the UN." 
The Security Council crisis, precipitated by the Iraq war, 
brought the issue of reform to the fore but it was not the first 
time that such reform had been discussed. Almost since the 
founding of the UN, the structure of the Security Council has 
been a point of contention for those who believe that they are 
effectively disenfranchised within the UN system. Countries that 
do not hold a privileged position as a permanent member com-
plain that the Security Council does not represent the general UN 
membership and that its voting rights are highly skewed. The list 
of criticisms aimed at the UNSC has been summarized by Luck 
(2005): 
It is undemocratic and unrepresentative . It is inequitable 
in its composition, its decision-making rules, and its 
working methods . It is largely unaccountable and unres-
ponsive to its obligations towards other principle organs, 
particularly the General Assembly and the Economic and 
Social Council (ECOSOC) . As a result, it lacks credibili-
ty and legitimacy .. .. 
From this perspective, the Security Council's waning legiti-
macy has less to do with Iraq than it has to do with a perceived 
lack of equity. The problem is rooted in process rather than poli-
cy. The underlying assumption of most, if not all reform efforts, 
is that the exclusionary nature of the UNSC reduces its legitima-
cy and therefore undermines support for its decisions. Improve 
representational equity and UNSC effectiveness wiU be en-
hanced. This conclusion however omits one very important fac-
tor for it ignores the realities of the UNSC power structure. 
Clearly any reform, if it is to be successful, must also take into 
account the interests of the five veto-wielding permanent mem-
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bers (PS). UN Charter amendments must be approved by the PS 
and it is unrealistic to expect they would vote to undermine their 
own authority. 
The issues of equity, efficiency and legitimacy, and the inter-
ests of the PS are therefore central to UNSC reform and are the 
focus of this paper. These issues constitute the main impediments 
to successful UNSC reform and provide a useful gauge by which 
to assess recent reform proposals. Whether UNSC reform will 
ultimately prove to be successful remains to be seen, but it is 
clear that the undertaking will not be easy. The historical record 
indicates that making adjustments to UN practice have been ar-
duous and Charter amendments have been exceedingly rare. 
A BRIEF msTORY OF SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM 
The UN was born out of World War II and is a reflection of 
the global power structure in place at that time. Planning for the 
new world body began before the war's end in a series of meet-
ings held among allied powers, but much of the groundwork had 
already been laid by the U.S. Department of State. As early as 
1940, post-war policy proposals that included the establishment 
of an international organization were being promoted by the 
United States. These became more concrete in 1942 when repre-
sentatives of twenty-six nations signed the Declaration by the 
United Nations in Washington, D.C., that pledged to fight the 
Axis powers collectively, pending the establishment of a more 
permanent system of general security. This was the first time that 
the term "United Nations" had been used, but the structural de-
tails of the organization would be left to later negotiations. Dis-
cussions continued at conferences held in Moscow and Tehran 
during 1943, Dumbarton Oaks, Washington D.C., during 1944, 
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and at Yalta in 1945. The UN Charter was finalized during a two-
month conference held in San Francisco in 1945. 1 
The history of the founding of the UN has continued relev-
ance for today's discussion on Security Council reform, because 
much of the criticism that is leveled at the UNSC stems from its 
initial structure. Contrary to popular belief, the UN was not es-
tablished on the elusive footing of idealistic hopes and dreams, 
but rather on the practical and vigorous give-and-take of power 
politics. Certainly, major powers sought to maintain international 
peace and security, but they were only willing to do so if their 
sovereign rights were protected and if they were accorded spe-
cial privileges. Nor was the UN founded on democratic prin-
ciples. Rather it was intended that the UN represent sovereign 
states, which may or may not be democratic, not the peoples of 
the world (Schlesinger 1997). 
The UN structure that emerged from San Francisco con-
tained six main organs, but only the Security Council (UNSC) 
was vested with significant power. UNSC membership was nei-
ther representative of the entire body, nor democratic in its deli-
berations. Membership was limited to eleven countries and only 
five of them had permanent seats with veto power. The perma-
nent five members, China, France, Soviet Union, U.K. and U.S., 
assumed such privileges as a precondition for participation. As 
Senator Tom Connally of Texas, Chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations stated to critics of the veto, "You may go home from 
San Francisco-if you wish-and report that you have defeated 
the veto . . . But you can also say 'We tore up the Charter" (Schle-
singer 2004). 
That the other member states reluctantly accepted this ulti-
matum was based on a realistic assessment of international poli-
1 For a detailed account of the negotiations surrounding the drafting of the UN Charter 
see Schlesinger (2004). 
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tics. It was clear that if the UNSC was to achieve results then it 
must have great power support. The League of Nations had been 
undermined by the refusal of the United States to join. It was 
also limited by a thoroughly democratic but unworkable tenet 
that gave every country a veto. The lessons then were clear to 
all-- the great powers had to be involved and they had to be per-
mitted special privileges. As Evans (1993) notes, 
to convince the permanent members to adhere to the 
Charter and the collective security framework embodied 
therein , a deliberate decision was taken to establish a col-
lective security system that could not be applied to the 
permanent members themselves . 
The organization that was born in San Francisco therefore 
emerged as a hybrid of two seemingly incompatible systems. On 
the one hand it contained features reminiscent of the 19th century 
Concert of Europe, in which great powers were accorded special 
privileges and responsibilities in policing the continent. On the 
other, it displayed Wilsonian characteristics that gave smaller 
powers representation. Within the UNSC the 'concert' model 
was manifested in the PS, while the Wilsonian model was 
represented by the non-permanent seats that were to be rotated 
among lesser powers (Laurenti 1997). 
The UNSC structure remained unchanged for twenty years, 
until 1965 when its membership was expanded from eleven to 
fifteen members. The number of permanent members remained 
unchanged, but non-permanent seats were increased from six to 
ten. This first reform of the Security Council was precipitated by 
a large influx of new member states in the immediate post-war 
period, largely due to de-colonization. In the fifteen years after 
its founding, the UN more than doubled in size and pressure to 
recognize this new reality became the catalyst for reform. Of 
particular concern was the need to recognize African and Asian 
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states that previously had no Security Council representation. 
egotiations settled on regional representation for non-
permanent seats: five seats for Africa and Asia, two from Latin 
America and Caribbean, two for' Western Europe and other 
states, and one for Eastern Europe (Bennett and Oliver 2002). 
Proposals for further Security Council reform emerged pe-
riodically throughout the 1970s and 1980s, but it was not until 
the 1990s that such suggestions gained greater urgency. Calls for 
reform surfaced against the backdrop of a radically changed 
global political system. The end of the Cold War brought with it 
new hopes that the UN in general, and the Security Council in 
particular, could be revitalized. Indeed, as the Security Council 
became increasingly active in the early 1990s, especially with 
regards to peacekeeping, it appeared that a new era of interna-
tional cooperation had dawned. Changes in the bipolar structure 
of global power had a significant impact on discussions related 
to UNSC reform. With the collapse of Soviet control in Eastern 
Europe, why designate separate seats for Eastern and Western 
Europe? Moreover, the number of UN members had greatly in-
creased since the last Security Council reform in 1965, increas-
ing from 117 to 192 today.2 A strong case for representation was 
also made by Germany and Japan, which were now major con-
tributors to the UN budget and important economic and political 
players on the world stage. Finally, calls for UNSC reform were 
reinforced in Secretary General Boutros Ghali's ambitious Agen-
da for Peace published in 1992. Although this report focused 
primarily on ways to strengthen the UN's capacity to maintain 
peace, it nevertheless provoked discussion on the broader issue 
of Security Council reform. 
' Nevertheless , the proportion of UNSC seats, as a percentage of total membership , has 
been declining since 1945. At the UN's founding, UNSC seats represented 21% of total 
membership . After the first expansion in 1965 this figure was 13%, today it is 8%. 
VOL. 37 2008 
138 GLEN 
THE CHALLENGES OF REFORM 
Despite numerous calls for Security Council reform that 
have been heard over the decades, adjustments have remained 
somewhat limited. Some of the difficulties in reforming the 
UNSC stem from its original structure and some are of more re-
cent origin. In either case, the disparate goals of all of the UN 
member states, large and small, powerful and weak will not be 
easy to satisfy, and significant challenges remain. 
Equitable Representation 
Geographic representation in the UNSC is heavily tilted in 
favor of the Global North. Four out of five permanent seats are 
allocated to developed countries, and this imbalance becomes 
more obvious when examined in terms of UN membership 
growth. Most of the growth in UN membership has occurred 
among African and Asian states. So that today, developing coun-
tries constitute more than two-thirds of the UN membership. 
Procedures for electing nonpermanent members to the 
UNSC contribute to the distortion. Elections for nonpermanent 
seats are held by the General Assembly in pre-determined re-
gional groupings. For individual countries, selection depends on 
being elected by a regional group, or waiting one's tum in a rota-
tional system. Whether a particular country gets the chance to 
serve on the UNSC is therefore partially determined by the size 
of the regional group in which it holds membership. Clearly, this 
structural arrangement gives countries in smaller groups a higher 
probability of being selected. For instance, since the last UNSC 
enlargement in 1965 Italy, a member of the Western Europe and 
Others Group (WEOG, with 28 members3) has served five times, 
3 This figure does not include Israel, which has been partially admitted to WEOG on a tempo-
rary basis beginning in May 2002 but only in connection with elections to UN bodies 
Note continues 
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while Nigeria, the leading participant in the Africa group (53 
members) has served on the UNSC only twice. 4 Advocates for 
reform maintain that this system undermines the principle of so-
vereign equality of all member states established by the Charter 
and fails to provide equality of opportunity for all countries to 
serve on the main UN institutions. 
Much of the acrimony surrounding the question of UNSC 
reform centers on the issue of equitable geographic representa-
tion, but in terms of Charter provisions this emphasis is some-
what off track. Article 23 that governs UNSC membership refers 
to equitable geographic distribution of seats not equitable repre-
sentation. This is an important distinction for it is obvious that 
the former can be obtained without the latter. How representative 
is Saudi Arabia or Iran, for instance, of the entire continent of 
Asia? Moreover, the Charter stipulation for equitable distribution 
follows other provisions apparently deemed more important. The 
specific Charter reference states that in selecting non-permanent 
members to the UNSC, due regards should be "specially paid in 
the first instance to the contributions of Members of the United 
Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security 
and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equita-
ble geographic distribution" (UN Charter 1945, Article 23). 
Equitable geographic distribution seems like an after thought; the 
founders of the UN apparently endorsed capability over parity. 
The Security Council was never designed to be the democratic 
arm of the UN. Instead, that designation was granted to the Gen-
held in New York . Israel is the only UN member state that is not a full member of any 
regional group . 
• A full list of countries elected to the UNSC can be found at http://www.un.org . 
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eral Assembly, where egalitarianism is enshrined in the principle 
of one country-one vote.5 
Efficiency and Legitimacy 
The optimum size of any decision-making body is the size 
that maximizes internal efficiency, while retaining its external 
legitimacy. Too small and it may lose the support of those for 
whom it operates. Too large and deadlock becomes a real possi-
bility. Achieving a balance between these two poles is the key. 
It would seem that a very limited expansion of the UNSC 
would aid expeditious decision-making, particularly in times of 
crisis. TI1e UNSC has primary responsibility for maintaining 
global peace and security; it cannot afford to be hindered by ex-
cessive debate and speechrnaking. Moreover, a smaller Council 
would make it easier to reach agreement on resolutions. Current-
ly, nine out of fifteen votes and the concurrence of the permanent 
members are required to pass a resolution. If the UNSC is in-
creased significantly, the result could be a Council that is only 
marginally more representative, but considerably more cumber-
some. 
On the other hand, the question of efficiency is not purely a 
numbers game. Efficiency must also be viewed in terms of polit-
ical influence. A larger Security Council that is at least perceived 
to be more representative, and therefore more legitimate, should 
find it easier to gain support for its decisions. TI1e question of 
efficiency therefore cannot be separated from the issue of legiti-
macy. Projecting legitimate authority is vital for UNSC success 
for it has no means to enforce its decisions. Once military action 
is authorized, the UNSC must rely on the cooperation of member 
s It should be noted however , that although the General Assembly is based on the prin-
ciple of one country, one vote, its power is largely limited to making non-binding rec-
ommendations . A notable exception relates to recommendations on the UN budget. 
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states to implement that mandate. As a result, a larger Council 
could conceivably be more effective than a smaller one. Al-
though it may be easier to build consensus in a smaller arena, if 
that agreement excludes important dissenting voices, then it is a 
false consensus that will be less likely to generate support. 
For some member states legitimacy is synonymous with re-
presentation. For others it is tied to efficiency and effective re-
sponse. These positions appear incongruous but are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. While it seems contrary to the 
interests of existing members, especially the PS, to increase the 
size of the UNSC could be advantageous if new members also 
bring additional resources. The history of Security Council ac-
tions demonstrates that mandates are often delayed for lack of 
resources or seriously underfunded. Expanding the UNSC to in-
clude countries that are able and willing to contribute to the 
maintenance of peace and security could increase available re-
sources and be an acceptable trade-off that would offset the inef-
ficiencies generated by increased size. 
Permanent Five Interests 
The UN was founded on a compromise between the great 
powers to manage and protect their interests and their special 
status was embodied in the veto. Since it is inconceivable that 
any PS member would voluntarily relinquish this privilege, the 
national interests of the PS will continue to dominate UNSC ac-
tion, or inaction, for the foreseeable future. The interests of the 
permanent five are most obviously displayed in the use of the 
veto. Since the founding of the UN until January 1997 the veto 
has exercised 261 times. However, its use has been declining in 
recent years.6 
6 207 of these vetoes occurred before 1986 (http ://www.un.org) . 
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In order to be implemented, a UNSC reform proposal must 
receive two-thirds support from the General Assembly and the 
approval of nine existing members of the Security Council, in-
cluding ratification by all five permanent members. The posi-
tions that the PS countries take regarding UNSC reform is there-
fore of ultimate importance. Not surprisingly, none of the PS has 
stated a preference for expanding veto power to additional 
member states. This would simply add the potential for further 
obstructionism. So with discussion of veto power effectively off 
the table, the permanent five have narrowed the range of possible 
options that can be considered. 
Of all the PS members, none is more important to the UN 
than the United States. The US was instrumental in founding the 
organization and is currently the largest contributor to the UN 
budget. 7 The attitude of the US government is crucial not only 
for the viability of UNSC reform, but also for the success of the 
UN more generally. The US emerged from the Cold War as the 
unrivaled superpower. This preeminence of American military 
might conditions its responses toward tl1e UN. During the early 
1990s, when tl1e world was emerging from the Cold War, George 
H. W. Bush found the UN to be a useful multilateral tool with 
which to pursue US interests abroad, especially regarding Iraq. 
However, as US supremacy becan1e increasingly apparent 
throughout the 1990s, a retreat from multilateralism also became 
obvious. When George W. Bush took office in 2000, the progress 
towards unilateralism accelerated, exemplified in tl1e National 
Security Strategy (2003), which proclaims, "we will not hesitate 
to act alone." 
The implications of this shift in US policy toward unilateral-
ism are serious for the UN. The UN cannot hope to operate for 
7 Although the U.S. is subject to the highest budget assessment, its payments are current-
ly in arrears. 
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very long without US financial and military support. To a large 
extent then, UNSC reform involves recognizing the interests of 
the US, and keeping the US committed. o reform will occur if 
it is contrary to US interests. Kofi Annan has implicitly recog-
nized this imperative. In his "fork in the road" speech to the 
General Assembly, Annan (2003) noted "it is not enough to de-
nounce unilateralism, unless we also face up squarely to the con-
cerns that make some states feel uniquely vulnerable, since it is 
those concerns that drive them to take unilateral action." UN 
reform, in all of its manifestations, will only succeed if it recog-
nizes and embraces the political power realities of the early 21st 
century. 
SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM PROPOSALS 
Most of the reform proposals now on the table emerged after 
the divisive Security Council debates over Iraq. However a ma-
jor study, known as the Raza.Ii Plan was published prior. The Ra-
zali plan was produced by the Open-Ended Working Group on 
the Questions of Equitable Representation on an Increase in the 
Me mbership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related 
to the Security Council, which began deliberations in 1993 and 
reported during 1997.8 The report was named after the President 
of the General Assembly, Raza.Ii Ismail from Malaysia. The main 
recommendations of the Razali plan included the expansion of 
the UNSC to twenty-four members, with new permanent and 
non-permanent seats. A comparison of the Razali plan with the 
current composition of the UNSC is displayed in Table 1. 
• This panel was established in 1993 under General Assembly resolution 48/26. 
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Table 1 
Current Security Council and Razali Plan 
Current Razali Plan Security Council 
Permanent 
Number 5 IO 
• China • 5 Afiica and Asia 
• France • 2 L. America & Carib. 
Held by • Russia • 1 E. Europe 
• UK • I W. Europe & others 
• us 
Non-Perman ent 
Number 10 14 
• Current , plus • Current, plus 
• two industriali zed • one each from Asia, 
Held by countries L. America , Africa, 
• one each from and Eastern Europe 
Asia, L. America , 
Africa 
Total 15 24 
The Razali plan aimed to broaden geographic representation 
on the UNSC and make it more equitable. The number of per-
manent seats would be doubled to ten, but taking into account 
the interests of the P5, Razali did not envisage veto power for the 
new members. Two of the new permanent seats would be allo-
cated to industrialized countries, which, it was widely believed 
would be Japan and Germany, since these countries are second 
and third largest contributors to the UN budget respectively. 
Asia, Latin America, and Africa would each receive one addi-
tional permanent and one additional nonperrnanent seat, while 
Eastern Europe would be allocated one more nonpermanent seat 
only. 
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Despite years of consultations and much negotiated com-
promises with representatives of 165 countries, the Razali Plan 
was never put to a vote. Opposition came from several sources. 
Developing countries, led by the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM) argued that under the Razali plan industrialized countries 
would further dominate the UNSC. Since the plan was to be in-
troduced in stages, and only the final stage would have to be ap-
proved by a two-thirds majority, the NAM was especially 
alarmed by the prospect that Japan and Germany would gain 
permanent seats "through the back door" (Borantonos and Mag-
li veras 2002, 26). They argued that such an action would violate 
Article 108 of the Charter, which requires approval of two-thirds 
of the General Assembly for Charter amendments. However, 
some of the most vociferous opposition came from the so-called 
"Coffee Club," led by Italy. The Coffee Club was a group of 
middle-sized states from across all regional groupings that col-
lectively came together to oppose any new permanent seat addi-
tions. The club was particularly concerned about the possibility 
that regional rivals would gain these seats. As a result of strong 
opposition, momentum for Security Council reform came to a 
halt, with the exception of a commitment included in the Millen-
nium Declaration (2000) that obliged member states to "intensify 
their efforts to achieve comprehensive reform of the Security 
Council in all its aspects." 
The Security Council crisis precipitated by fundamental dis-
agreements over Iraq resurrected the reform debate. Secretary 
General Kofi Annan (2003) declared that the UN had reached a 
"fork in the road ... no less decisive than 1945, when the United 
Nations was founded." He went on to present a case for UN 
reform that included appeals to make the UN more representa-
tive and relevant for 21st century requirements. To examine 
reform options, Annan appointed a sixteen member High Level 
Panel of "eminent persons" in September 2003. One of the man-
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dates of the panel was to recommend changes necessary to en-
sure effective collective action, including a review of the prin-
cipal organs of the United Nations. 
The panel presented its final report, A More Secure World: 
Our Shared Responsibility, to the Secretary-General on Decem-
ber 2, 2004. Included in the report's 101 recommendations, were 
two specific proposals on UNSC expansion (see Table 2). 
Table 2 
High Level Panel Reform Proposals 
Proposed Proposed 
No. of Permanent New 2-year 
Region States (continuing) Permanent Nonpermanent Total 
Model A 
Africa 53 0 2 4 6 
Asia pacific 56 1 2 3 6 
Europe 47 3 1 2 6 
Americas 35 1 1 4 6 
Totals 191 5 6 13 24 
ModelB 
Africa 53 0 2 4 6 
Asia paci fie 56 1 2 3 6 
Europe 47 3 2 1 6 
Americas 35 1 2 3 6 
Totals 191 5 8 11 24 
The High Level Panel followed Razali in recommending an in-
crease in UNSC seats to twenty-four, but departed from Razali's 
specific recommendations regarding how they should be allo-
cated. Model A would add six new permanent seats and three 
new nonpermanent seats, while Model B would add a new 
second tier of eight four-year renewable seats plus one additional 
nonpermanent seat. In both cases the objective was to create a 
balance among all geographic areas, with six seats being allo-
cated to each region. These regional divisions differ from both 
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the Razali proposals and from current UNSC arrangements. For 
the first time, Africa would gain an independent entitlement to 
six seats-an obvious improvement over current arrangements 
that allocates just five seats to be shared by a 'gentleman's 
agreement' among the entire Africa-Asia region. 
The High Level Panel left decisions on which countries 
should be assigned the new seats to the General Assembly. How-
ever, it did recommend that preferences for the longer term seats 
be given to those countries that "are among the top three finan-
cial contributors in their relevant regional area to the regular 
budget, or the top three voluntary contributors from their region-
al area, or the top three troop contributors from their regional 
area to United Nations peacekeeping missions" (High Level 
Panel, 2004, clause 254). This point was reiterated a year later by 
Kofi Annan, in his report, In Larger Freedom (2005). 
The panel recommended no change in the veto held by the 
five permanent members. Despite recognizing that the veto is 
both anachronistic and "unsuitable for the institution in an in-
creasingly democratic age" (High Level Panel, 2004, clause 
256), panel members could not envisage any practical means by 
which the veto could be eliminated. They did request however 
that permanent members refrain from using the veto in cases of 
genocide and large-scale human rights abuses. The panel also 
recommended that processes to improve transparency and ac-
countability be incorporated and formalized in the Council's 
rules of procedure (clause 258). 
Although Models A and B seemed to offer something for 
everyone and had the advantage of not challenging the authority 
of the PS, criticism and alternative proposals emerged very 
quickly after the publication of the High Level Panel's report. 
During summer 2004 three additional proposals appeared that 
added to the High Level Panel's recommendations (see Table 3). 
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Table3 
Alternative UNSC Reform Proposals 
ew Total 
ew Non- Security Veto 
Perma- Permanent Council power 
Group nent Seats Seats Seats Extended? 
G4 6 4 25 Maybe 
African Union 6 5 26 Yes 
Uniting for Consensus 0 10 25 No 
On July 6111, Germany, Japan, India, and Brazil (G4) submit-
ted their proposals to the General Assembly as the culmination of 
an intense, coordinated campaign to lobby for new permanent 
seats. By acting together and representing several continents it 
was hoped that they would increase their chances of receiving 
the two-thirds support in the General Assembly that would be 
requir~d. The G4 framework envisages enlargement of the 
UNSC to include six new permanent seats, two each for Africa 
and Asia, one for western states, and one for Latin America and 
Caribbean. The proposal also included provisions for four non-
permanent seats, one each for Africa, Asia, Latin America and 
the Caribbean, and for Eastern Europe. A decision on the grant-
ing of veto power would be postponed until a review conference 
was held 15 years following Charter amendment. 
A week after the G4 proposal was introduced, the African 
Union (AU) presented a draft resolution that was similar to the 
G4 proposals but with a couple of important differences. The AU 
argued that veto power should either be abolished for all or ex-
tended to include incoming permanent members. If extended, the 
power should be limited to only the most vital areas related to 
peace and security. The African states also sought an additional 
nonpermanent seat for Africa. 
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A third major proposal came on July 21st from the Uniting 
for Consensus group, comprised of most of the old Coffee Club 
members. 9 The latest proposal includes two alternative models 
that would each add an additional ten nonpermanent seats as-
signed to individual states. 10 Both of these variations would re-
tain the current regional groupings, rather than the new regional 
groupings created by the High Level Panel. 
Italy broke slightly · with the other Uniting for Consensus 
members in suggesting that rather than seats being allocated to 
individual countries, regional groups should have operational 
management to prevent the national occupation of the new seats. 
As the Coffee Club had argued before, all of the members of the 
Uniting for Consensus group strongly oppose the addition of any 
new permanent seats. 
A somewhat different approach to reform was presented to 
the General Assembly by Costa Rica, Jordan, Lichtenstien, Si-
ganpore, and Switzerald (known as the S-5) during March 2006. 
Rather than focusing on the contentious issue of expansion, this 
group was primarily concerned with improving the working me-
thods of the Council. They made nineteen specific recommenda-
tions that emphasized the need for greater transparency within 
the UNSC as well as improved communications between the 
Council and the general membership. Regarding use of the veto, 
the S-5 recommended that a permanent member should explain 
its veto at the time of its use. Then that explanation should be 
circulated as a Security Council document to all members of the 
9 The Uniting for Consensus U.S. membership is comprised of Argentina, Canada, Co-
lombia, Costa Rica, Italy, Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, San Marino, 
Spain and Turkey. 
'
0 The two proposals are known as the Green and Blue Models. The Green Model is 
similar to the High Level Panel' s Model A, but creates new regional groups. The Blue 
Model is a variation of the High Level Panel's Model B, in that it creates a new category 
of longer terms seats, but it also expands the number of two-year seats. 
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UN. In addition, the S-5 echoed the High Level Panel by stating 
that permanent members should refrain from casting a negative 
vote in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity, and serious 
violations of international humanitarian law (General Assembly, 
2006a). 
Although the S-5 report, in the words of one Japanese dele-
gate "captured wide attention" and was viewed as a "meaningful 
first step" (General Assembly, 2006b), it does little to solve the 
key issues of equity and representation. Moreover, the response 
of the PS was lukewarm at best. In a Note ji-om the President of 
the Security Council on Improving Working Methods (Security 
Council, 2006) the UNSC pledged to increase transparency and 
increase consultations; however it made no mention of altering 
the conditions under which the veto would be used. The S-5 
were also reminded by US Ambassador John Bolton that the 
"Charter gave the Council sole authority over its own working 
methods" (Bolton 2006). 
Constraints Imposed by Regional Rivalries 
Although almost all UN members have stated that they are in 
favor of some degree of Security Council reform, resistance to 
the proposals thus far presented has been significant. Opposition 
is clearly rooted in P5 self-interest, but it can also be found in the 
form of regional political rivalries. It has been relatively easy to 
reach agreement that reform is needed, especially among coun-
tries that feel disenfranchised. Yet, consensus on which countries 
should benefit from reform remains elusive. 
Despite having some legitimate claims the G4 countries face 
considerable challenges in winning their desired permanent 
seats . The case made by the Japanese and German governments 
rests on the value of their financial contributions as the second 
and third largest contributors to the UN budget respectively. 
Both countries positions were reinforced through much of the 
T H E JO URNA L OF POLI T ICAL SCIENCE 
mE CHALLENGES OF SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM 151 
1990s, because they could count on the support of the Clinton 
administration, but this endorsement weakened with the George 
W. Bush presidency. While the US still favors a Japanese seat, it 
refused to endorse a German candidacy following disagreements 
over the Iraq war. The Japanese claim is still far from assured 
because of opposition from China. The Chinese government has 
given its tacit support to a grassroots campaign conducted on 
popular Chinese web sites that seeks to block Japan's bid. More 
explicitly, the Chinese government stated that reform should fo-
cus on increasing the representation of developing countries on-
ly, and called the G4's push for an early vote "dangerous and 
divisive" (Kahn, 2005) . 
The G4 plan is also opposed by the Uniting for Consensus 
group. That group came into existence primarily as a reaction to 
the G4 refonn campaign. As an indication of the acrimony of the 
discussion, some members of the Uniting for Consensus group 
have accused the G4 of trying to hijack the reform process for 
their own benefit. Pakistan described the four countries as "seek-
ers of special privileges and power masquerading as the cham-
pions of the weak and disadvantaged" (Akram, 2005) . At the 
same time, Italy accused the G4 of using aid money to buy votes 
and demanded an investigation into their "improper and unethi-
cal behavior" (Lederer, 2005). Committee sessions became so 
heated that Secretary-General Kofi Annan urged nations "to calm 
down" when debating enlargement of the U.N. Security (Leo-
pold, 2005). The most serious blow to the hopes of the G4 came 
in August 2005 when Washington and Beijing reached an agree-
ment to work in "parallel" to block the G4 plan. They have not 
stated whether or not they are willing to use veto power, but 
clearly this is an option. Although officially, the US supports a 
permanent seat on the Security Council for Japan, it rejects the 
G4 plan, the only serious proposal that would make this a reality . 
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The US does not want Brazil, Germany, and India to gain per-
manent seats. 
Disagreements among regional rivals with regards to UNSC 
reform also plague the African continent. The front-runners for 
the permanent seats in the AU proposal are South Africa, Nige-
ria, Kenya, Egypt, Libya and Senegal, but the AU has been una-
ble to devise a clear plan to decide on which countries to choose. 
In keeping with the High Level Panel 's recommendation that 
consideration should be given to countries that contribute most 
to the United Nations fmancially, militarily and diplomatically, 
the AU stated that it would establish criteria to ensure that the 
selected countries would be representative of Africa and would 
have the capacity to act. Such decisions, however, are far from 
straightforward. What does it mean to be a representative of 
Africa? Based on population Nigeria would be the first choice, 
but Nigeria has been an unreliable financial partner. It is a chron-
ically late contributor to the UN budget and has a large national 
debt. Libya may be regarded as being more representative, 
Muammar Gaddafi is widely viewed as the father of the African 
Union, but this choice would likely face opposition from outside 
of the AU. By contrast, another front-runner Egypt, is considered 
more favorably in the Global North but been accused by some of 
not being African enough (Okumu, 2005) 
With the AU being unable to make a fmal decision, some 
African countries have sought partnerships with member states 
from other regions and on the Security Council. South Africa has 
engaged in negotiations with Brazil, India, and Japan. Nigeria 
has moved closer to China and Russia, while Egypt is hoping for 
US support. France has backed Senegal but its candidacy will 
likely face strong opposition from China since Senegal has es-
tablished diplomatic relations with Taiwan (Okumu, 2005). Of 
all prospective candidates, South Africa seems to be the top con-
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tender for one of the African seats but regional rival Nigeria is 
still working frantically to undermine its chances. 
The Uniting for Consensus group is most concerned with 
blocking the addition of new permanent seats. It favors ten non-
permanent seats only. This position therefore brings them into 
direct opposition with both the G4 and the AU which seek the 
addition of permanent seats. The Uniting for Consensus group 
has been accused of obstructionism as it has sought to block G4 
attempt to bring the issue to an early vote. While the UC group 
has accused the G4 of undue haste, the G4 points out that discus-
sions on reform of the Security Council have been on going, in 
earnest, for well over a decade (Oshima 2005). The G4 therefore 
maintains that failure to act would not only mean that an historic 
opportunity for meaningful change would be missed, it would 
also undermine the legitimacy of an already discredited Security 
Council. A representative of the G4 from Brazil also noted that 
restricting the expansion of the Council to non-permanent mem-
bers would risk increasing the disparity in the Council's compo-
sition (Sardenberg 2005). 
Many of these divergent positions were clearly expressed 
during the 2005 World Sununit and during consultations held in 
the General Assembly plenary during July 2006. The positions 
are summarized in Table 4. The data include only the positions of 
those who spoke during these sessions and the co-sponsors of the 
main proposals. 
Table 4 confinns that there is little support for maintaining 
the status quo with ninety-seven percent, including all of the P5, 
in favor of expanding the number of UNSC seats. However, 
tl1ere appears to be limited agreement beyond that point. Support 
for the G4 and African Union proposals is fairly evenly split, but 
only the G4 plan has some PS support. It is also worth noting 
that whereas the G4 proposal draws support from countries 
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across most of the regional groups, the African Union plan finds 
support from the African group only. 11 
The addition of new permanent seats is also widely sup-
ported but there is disagreement over which countries should be 
granted such seats. It is of particular significance that the PS dif-
fers on this issue. There is consensus among the PS however 
Table 4 
M ember State Positions on UN Reform 
Percent 
Proposal Favoring PS Support 
Support at 2005 World Summit 
G4 34.4 France 
G4 with conditions 8.8 UK 
African Union 37.7 None 
Uniting for Consensus 13.3 None 
China 
Postpone vote 5.5 Russia 
us 
Support at 2006 Plenary 
China 
France 
UNSC Expansion 97 Russia 
UK 
us 
France 
New Permanent seats 69 UK 
us 
Extend veto to new seats 13 None 
Source: Author compiled from information from http ://www.reformtheun .org. 
11 The G4 plan is supported by countries that are members of the following groups : Asia , 
Eastern Europe, Latin American and Western Europe and Others . 
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with regards to the veto. No P5 member has expressed support 
for extending the veto to new members or limiting its current 
use . 
Despite agreement on some reform proposals , none has ma-
naged to gamer unequivocal support . The need to preserve self-
interest has thus far proven stronger than the need to break with 
the status quo. So what is feasible at this stage? Yet another re-
port presented to the General Assembly during April 2007 en-
deavored to address this question. The report , produced by five 
"facilitators" appointed by the General Assembly in February , 
was designed to elucidate "notions of the way forward" based on 
a series of closed-door consultations with member states (Facili-
tators 2007). In their report , the facilitators recognize that since 
an "ideal" solution may not be possible at this stage, a transition -
al approach could be used to break the deadlock. They suggest 
specifically that members discuss creating an intermediary ar-
rangement that would expand the number of nonperrnanent seats 
as well as extend their time limits . The question of permanent 
seats would be temporarily set aside and the new arrangement 
would be subject to review at a pre-determined date. This ap-
proach has the advantage of avoiding the most contentious issue 
concerning the allocation of permanent seats, but it contains little 
that is new and is unlikely to be the catalyst for change. Despite 
pleas by the facilitators for members to remain flexible on the 
issue of Security Council reform, statements made in response to 
their report indicate that all parties remain firmly entrenched. 12 
CONCLUSION 
The history of UNSC reform demonstrates that the institu-
tional structures created by the great powers in 1945 are not easi-
ly altered . Despite being widely recognized as unrepresentative 
" For a list of statement s conce rnin g the fac il itators report pl ease see 
http://www.reformtheun.org 
VOL. 37 2008 
156 GLEN 
and anachronistic, there are currently few realistic possibilities 
for reform. The strongest case for reform has been made on the 
grounds of equity. In composition, the UN is a very different 
place today than it was in 1945. Many of the more recent mem-
bers continue to argue that their voices are being excluded . 
Countries such as Japan and Germany make significant contribu-
tions to the UN budget. Yet, their formal political power does not 
match their economic contributions. 
The very broad level of support for UNSC membership ex-
pansion seems to indicate that the equity problem may be reme-
died by adding nonpermanent seats. This action would have the 
benefit of increasing geographic representation, and perhaps le-
gitimacy, without much cost to permanent members. Indeed, if 
these countries also brought resources that they were willing to 
contribute to UN operations, then the presence of additional 
nonpermanent members would also add value. The unknown of 
course, is whether member states that have long held out for 
permanent seats would be willing to settle for less. 
Successful UNSC reform must also strike a balance between 
national and collective interests. Although problems and poten-
tial solutions have become increasingly global in nature , the UN 
continues to operate on a Westpahlian model based on sovereign-
ty and self-interest. In such a world , multilateral cooperation is 
possible but it must be based on shared and obvious benefits. 
This is especially true when it comes to gaining the support of 
the PS. The United States for instance, has made it abundantly 
clear that it is more concerned witl1 reforming the UN to better 
deal with weapons of mass destruction and terrorism than with 
the niceties of equitable representation on the Security Council. 
It is therefore vital that the UN tackle such concerns earnestly, 
for the United States as well as other important players have 
come to view broad UN refom1 and specific Security Council 
reform as a package deal. 
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Finally, the failure of member states thus far to reach agree-
ment on UNSC reform despite years of effort is not surprising in 
the historical context. It is worth repeating that the UN Security 
Council was never intended to be democratic or equitable. The 
original structure of the UNSC was set up to protect and promote 
the interests of the P5. In all likelihood this arrangement will 
continue. The dispute over the Iraq war clearly demonstrated that 
the UN cannot prevent a major power from acting according to 
its own national interests. This is what the founders originally 
intended and that reality will remain with or without reform. 
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